"Experiments in the physics laboratory at Columbia University reveal that conditions may be found under which the chemical element uranium may be able to liberate its large excess of atomic energy, and that this might mean the possibility that uranium might be used as an explosive that would liberate a million times as much energy per pound as any known explosive. My own feeling is that the probabilities are against this, but my colleagues and I think that the bare possibility should not be disregarded." - George B. Pegram; Professor of Physics; Columbia University; Letter of introduction for Enrico Fermi to carry to the Dept. of the U.S. Navy in Washington, DC; March 1940.
By late 1939, several independent investigations into the "uranium question" were being conducted by laboratories across the United States including Berkeley, Columbia, Princeton, and the University of Minnesota.
There was no question that the United States Government would have to get involved in order to coordinate and fund the "project" if it was to have any chance of succeeding. Einstein's letter and the resulting Uranium Committee were important first steps.
However, there still lacked an overall "sense of urgency" amongst Briggs' committee and other government officials. Several things were impeding a decisive move forward:
Isolationism - There was still a strong influence in the U.S. at the time to "not get involved" in world problems.
Little Likelihood of Success - Many leading scientists remained adamant that the likelihood of producing a "nuclear weapon", especially in time to make a difference in the outcome of the "European" war, would be near impossible to attain. (Backing this up were early calculations by Edward Teller that as much as 30 tons of uranium would be required for a "critical mass", much too heavy for a bomb; and if U235 was found to be tremendously better, Bohr stated that "the United States would have to be turned into one big factory to produce enough of it to make a difference.)
Competing Theories - Various labs around the country were advocating different approaches to separating U235 from U238, each involving tremendous costs and several unknowns.
Counteracting this "thread of negativity" was a strong group of scientists who had fled Nazi Germany and left behind several able colleagues. They felt that Germany had a two year head start and could very well be on their way to producing a "usable" weapon by as early as 1942 - 1943.
Although America would commit millions of dollars to research in the ensuing few months, it was not until a group of British scientists issued a report (see the MAUD Report) outlining the feasibility of producing a nuclear weapon that the United States finally "stepped up to the plate" and took charge.
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Atomic Story of the Week
I used to sit in Pajarito Canyon and write letters to my future wife. My first encounter with security was when they sent back my first letters and said, “You can’t say that.”
“Can’t say what?”
Well, on the outside of the envelope were the letters “S.W.A.K.,” which if you’re my age, you know means “Sealed With A Kiss.” So I explained that, but “No, it’s code, you can’t say that.” So from then on, I didn’t put that!
McALLISTER HULL, LOS ALAMOS
Did You Know?
"We (the military leaders at Los Alamos) came up through kindergarten with them (the scientists). While they could put elaborate equations on the board, which we might not be able to follow in their entirety, when it came to what was so and what was probably so, we knew just about as much as they did. So when I say that we were responsible for the scientific decisions, I am not saying that we were extremely able nuclear physicists, because actually we were not. We were what might be termed "thoroughly" practical nuclear physicists." (General Leslie R. Groves, Commanding Officer, Manhattan Engineer District, 1955)
